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IMPLEMENTATION OF PUBLlC POLlCIESI 
In the last two dec~~es. central-state policies against violence against 
women (AV A W pO~lcles 10 what follows) have been similar in Spain to in 
other European Umon member states. Such measures have mainly been 
of four types: legal reforms, in order to declare violent actions against 
women unlawful acts which are punishable; diffusion of information 
about women's rights among the population; promotion of research 
about the phenomenon of violence against women and elaboration of 
statistics; and social services for victims of violence, for instance, refuges 
for battered women. Nevertheless, AVAW policies have been formulated 
and implemented with sorne delay in Spain in comparison with other 
W:estern countries. This deJay was due in part to the fact that since the 
ml~-1930s .to 1975 Spain was governed by a right-wing authoritarian 
reglme, whlch was notably anti-feminist. 
In Spai.n, as in many other industrial countries, A VA W poJicies have 
reached 10 the Jast two decades only partial achievements, mainly 
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use of problems of implementation. This chapter argues that this 
tation deficit can be partially explained cross-nationally by 
characteristics of this policy area. The implementation of most 
AVA W policies is the responsibility of a high number of street-level 
bureaucrats: judges, prosecutors, police, staff in hospital s, forensic 
surgeons (médicos forenses), and social workers, to name just a few. 
AlI of these bureaucrats treat directly with 'clients' (whether the alleged 
perpetrators of violence or their victims). These bureaucrats can easily 
jeopardize the implementation of most A V A W policies due to the fact 
t they have a high degree of discretion and autonomy to perform 
jobs, and are not subjected to strict supervision by the people who 
py higher positions in the organizations for which they work. 
The first section of this chapter describes the main A V A W policies in 
Spain. The secand section contains a description of the peculiarities of 
this policy area, which in all countries have hindered to variable degrees 
the implementation of most A VA W policies. The final section focuses on 
the role played by different social and political actors (chiefly feminists, 
state feminists,2 and state officials) in the policy-making process in Spain 
since 1975.3 
POLICIES AGAINST VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN SPAIN4 
A broad definition of the phenomenon of violence against women 
'includes any act of verbal or physical force, coercion or life-threatening 
deprivation, directed at an individual woman or girl that causes physical 
or psychological harm, humiliation or arbitrary deprivation of liberty 
and that perpetuates female subordination' (Heise et al. 1994, p. 1165). 
Nevertheless, for reasons of economy of space, time and research 
resources, this chapter focuses on the study of policies directed at 
the following violent behaviour against adult women: rape and any 
other form of sexual attack, and domestic violence, that is, violence 
perpetrated in the family sphere. Other violent behaviour, such as forced 
prostitution, sexual harassment at work, genital mutilation and abuse 
of female children are not considered in this chapter. 
As noted, the main A V A W policies in Spain are chiefly of four types: 
(i) legal reforms, (ii) actions to diffuse information about women's 
rights among the population, (iii) promotion of research about the 
phenomenon of violence against women and elaboration of statistics; 
(iv) social services for female victims of violence. 
With regard to legal reforms, they are the most important A V A W 
policies in Spain. In the penal cade (Código Penal), the different violent 
acts perpetrated against women are defined as either misdemeanours 
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(faltas) or offences (delitos), and each of them is assigned a punishment 
(pena), which is lower for misdemeanours than for offences. From 1975 
to 1989, sexual attacks againstwomen were stilllisted as before under the 
ti de 'offences against purity' (delitos contra la honestidad). Specifically, 
most sexual attacks against adult women different from rape were still 
called 'indecent abuses' (abusos deshonestos). This terminology was not 
an anecdote but a very telling aspect of the legal definition of such 
attacks, beca use it reflected the fact that when it was formulated it , 
was considered that perpetrators committed them against the purity, 
decency or chastity of women, and not against women's freedom to 
decide whether to engage or not in sexual relations.5 Besides, rape was 
defined in a very restricted way, beca use it referred only to heterosexual 
vaginal coitus, and not to anal or oral coitus, and beca use it was 
established that only men could rape women. Furthermore, in all cases 
of sexual attacks against women (including rape), if the victim 'forgave' 
the perpetrator, no prosecution could take place. 
Ir is important to note that divorce was established in Spain in 
1981 (Act Number 30 of July 7).6 This meant that if the executor 
of violent acts against a woman was her husband, she could not until 
1981 obtain a divorce, remaining therefore legally married (although 
perhaps separated) to the violent husband. A relevant reform of the 
penal code took place in 1983 (organic7 Act Number 8 of June 25), 
which established that even when victims of rape (not of other types of 
sexual attacks) forgave the perpetrators, they should still be punished 
according to the law. 
Ir should be noted that until1985 abortion was a crime in Spain in aH 
circumstances, penalized in most cases with a period of imprisonment 
which ranged from six months to six years, plus the prohibition on 
health professionals against performing their professions in private 
and public centres. Therefore, if a woman had been raped and 
became pregnant, according to the penal code, she had to give birth 
to the baby. Organic Act Number 9 of July 5 1985, however, allows 
abortion in three circumstances: when the woman has been raped, when 
pregnancy seriously endangers the life of the mother, and when the fetus 
has malformations. 
The most important reform of the penal code regarding violence 
against women took place in 1989 (organic Act Number 3 of June 
21), which instituted changes that had already taken place in other 
countries. Sexual attacks were no longer called 'offences against purity' 
but 'offences against sexual freedom' (delitos contra la libertad sexual). 
By the same token, sorne sexual attacks different from rape were 
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no longer called indecent abuses but sexual aggression (agr~siones 
sexuales). Besides this, the concept of rape was expanded to mclude 
not only vaginal, but also anal and oral coitus. Nevertheless, penetration 
with the penis is required in order to legally define an assault as rape. Two 
consequences follow immediately from this requirement: a sexual assault 
with penetration of foreign objects is not considered a rape; and men can 
rape women and men, but women can only rape men (Bustos 1~91,'p. 
115; Cabo 1993, p. 261). Rape, like homicide, is punished in Spam wlth 
a period of imprisonment which ranges from twelve to twenty years, a~d 
sexual aggression with a period of imprisonment which ranges from SIX 
months to twelve years. In both cases the perpetrator has to compensate 
the victim financially, although this sum of money is only very rarely paid 
to the victim (Rodríguez et al. 1988, p. 151). Another point should al so 
be remembered: rape and other sexual aggression are offences defined 
in the laws independendy from the marital or professional status of 
victims, for instance, irrespectively of whether the perpetrator is the 
husband of the victim, or whether she works as a prostitute (Bustos 
1991, p. 115). Finally, the 'forgiveness' of the victims of any of~ence 
against sexual freedom (and not only in the case of rape, as estabhshed 
in 1983), did not cancel the punishment for such behaviour. 
The 1989 reformed Article 425 of the Penal Code classified repeated 
physical domes tic violence against women perpetrated by husbands or 
cohabiting partners as an offence, and not as a misdemeanour, as It 
had be en legally defined in the pasto 'Repeated' (habitual) here means 
violence which has been perpetrated at least three times (Bustos 1991, 
p. 65; Cabo 1993, p. 229). The offence of repeated physical domestic 
violence is punished with a period of imprisonment which ranges from 
one to six months. 
Finally, since the 1989 reform, state officials (for instance.' p~ison 
guards) who take advantage of the power and influence ove~ thel.r clIents 
that their jobs confer, to ask for sexual favours of thelr chents or 
their relatives, are punished more severely than before (López 1992, 
pp. 317-23). . 
In relation to the diffusion of information about women's nghts, 
such diffusion is important because only when women are aware of 
their legal rights - among them, that nobody has the prerogative 
to treat them violently - can women efficiently defend themselves 
against assaults. Ir is also useful that women know which social 
services and other resources are available for them in case of being 
victims of violence. In this regard, the main state feminist institution of 
the central state, the Institute of the Woman (Instituto de la Mujer) -
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hereafter IW - created in 1983, has set up and administered women's 
rights information centres (centros de información de los derechos de 
la mujer) in Sorne cities, where citizens can obtain information about 
women's rights, through an enquiry made in person, by phone or by 
maiJ.8 As welI, a free-of-charge women's rights information phone line 
was set up in 1991, with the main purpose of reaching women who do 
not live in cities. In addition to these general information ser vices, the 
IW has organized several information campaigns related to the specific 
issue of violence against women (Gutiérrez, 1990, p. 125; Threlfall 
1985, p. 63). 
With respect to the promotion of research about the phenomenon 
of violence against women, it should be highlighted that up to 1983, 
when the IW was set up, very little research on women's issues existed in 
Spain, when compared with other Western cOuntries. The IW has since 
published books and periodicals, given grants to researchers, awarded 
books and artides, commissioned pieces of research, and established 
a documentation centre in Madrid to provide bibliographies and 
information to all citizens. A significant part of these research activities 
focuses on the phenomenon of violence against women (Instituto de la 
Mujer 1985, p. 29). 
A paramount dimension of research activities has been the collection 
of statistics of reported cases of violent attacks on women, statistics 
which, for instance, in the case of domestic violence, hardly existed in 
Spain unti11983. Peminists (and femocrats since the creation of the IW) 
have urged the police and civil guard - police who work chiefly in rural 
areas - to collect data of reported cases of aggression in which victims 
have been women (Gutiérrez 1990, p. 129). However, it is necessary 
to bear in mind that the Spanish statistics on this issue, as is the case 
with the statistics of many other countries, only deal with reported 
cases.
9 
In Spain, as in many other cOuntries (Kornblit 1994, p. 1181), 
undereporting is a common phenomenon, in such a way that estimations 
about the real number of cases are only tentative. Nevertheless, the 
judiciary was urged to collect data about court decisions (sentencias) 
regarding cases of violence against women (Gutíérrez 1989, p. 9), and 
the same happened with the personnel who work in social services, such 
as refuges for battered women (Spanish Senate 1989, pp. 12185-7). 
It should be noted that these statistics are in many cases in complete 
and hardly comparable (Rodríguez et al. 1988, pp. 35-7). 
Pinally, as for social services for female victims of violence, these 
have been set up later and are currently less comprehensive in Spain 
than in other countries, as happens with social services in general. 
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partly due to the peculiar characteristics of this policy area. These 
singular features refer to problem definition and policy formulation, 
but especially to policy implementation. 
With regard to problem definition, it is a crucial stage in the 
policy-making process beca use for a policy to exist, a situation must 
be conceptualized as a 'problem', about which state officials are 
willing to do something. In all countries, it has been very hard for 
feminists, state feminists and state officials to define violent behaviour 
against women as a social problem, beca use they had to counter-argue 
against those (among the general population and the political elite) 
who believed that no one could be seriously speaking about a problem 
which affects the whole society but rather about isolated episodes of 
violence committed by deviant or mentally disturbed men who live at 
the margins of society. Furthermore, these problem 'definers' had to 
break the assumption that violent acts against women pertain to the 
sphere of individual privacy, a realm where the state must refrain from 
intervening (Connors 1989, p. 49). Finally, they also had to diselaim 
the argument that violence is a normal - if regrettable - means to 
solve disputes and disagreements among people, that is, an ordinary 
component in human relations, and subsequently, that violent actions 
against women are not truly a problem but 'things of life'. 
In relation to policy formulation, one of the most important difficulties 
has been the high number of policy actors involved at this stage of the 
policy-making process. This obstaele can be elarified with the example 
of the several measures which deal with rape victims. As shown aboye, 
legal reforms have been passed in Spain by parliamentarians in order 
to expand the definition of rape to inelude not only vaginal, but also 
anal and oral intercourse, and also to permit rape victims who beco me 
pregnant to have an abortion. Nevertheless, policy formulation does 
not finish with the works of parliamentarians since rape victims need 
to be examined and treated by health professionals as soon as possible. 
Therefore, the Ministry of Health should give instructions to personnel 
employed in health centres to perform such tasks correctly. The Ministry 
of Health also has to organize the provision of abortions in health centres, 
and sorne social services such as therapy or psychological support have to 
be set up to help ra pe victims overcome such experiences and reconstitute 
their lives. As has been said, most of the provider organizations are 
non-governmental, non-profit associations, which receive sorne financial 
help from the sta te. Therefore, sorne state units, such as the Ministry of 
Social Affairs or the IW, have to formulate a policy of subsidizing social 
movements. If many executives are involved, concerted action among 
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them is required in order to formulate a coherent set of measures. But 
such concerted action is difficult to establish since each political executive 
has its own priorities which might not coincide with the priorities of 
the other state units. Moreover, generally speaking, the different state 
units (for instance, Ministries), are not used to working elosely with 
each other but loosely, or worse, independently. 
However, if difficulties exist with regard to the definition of the 
problem and policy formulation, the chief obstaeles for establishing most 
A V A W policies appear at the implementatíon leve!. This feature has been 
pointed out by other scholars. For example, Jill Radford (1992, p. 255), 
while examíning the treatment of domestic killíng by the legal system in 
England, elaims that 'discretion dominates every stage of the process-
from the decision to act on reports in the first place to the appropriate 
punishment for the crime at the final stages.' The Spanish case confirms 
Radford's proposition, since the main problem at the implementation 
stage (which frequently has been an insurmountable obstaele) has been 
the enormous number of 'street-level bureaucrats' who held disparate 
views on the same problem. Street-level bureaucrats are state officials 
who interact directly with citizens and 'have considerable discretion in 
determining the nature, amount, and quality of benefits and sanctions 
provided by their agencies' (Lipsky 1980, p. 3). As Michael Lipsky 
has elearly explained, several reasons account for this high degree of 
discretion, for example, that these bureaucrats are professionals, in the 
sense that they are expected to use their own knowledge and savoir-{aire 
to sol ve problems, which are quite complex and not easíly remedied by 
the implementatíon of routinized procedures. In addition, the population 
expect from such bureaucrats not only impartiality but also flexibility 
and responsiveness to unique circumstances. Furthermore, the number 
of rules which in theory street-level bureaucrats have to follow is almost 
infinite and these change constantly. No wonder, then that such state 
officials adhere only to the most basic rules and exercise discretion in 
the remaining aspects of their work, without being de {acto elosely 
supervised by anybody aboye them. Moreover, street-level bureaucrats' 
priorities can be different from the goals of the high-rank managers of 
the institutions and agencies for which they are working. As a result, 
although the basic guidelines of any policy are set up by legislators, or 
by policy-makers and high-Ievel bureaucrats, street-level bureaucrats 
can actually modífy and distort such basic guidelínes in accordance 
with their own priorities and views. Finally, civil service provisions, 
originally established to guarantee non-arbitrary hiring and promotion, 
actually confer a high degree of autonomy on civil servants, since it 
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is very costly for their superiors to fire them or to reduce their rank 
(Lipsky 1980, pp. 13-24). 
The numerous street-Ievel bureaucrats involved in most A V A W policies 
can easily obstruct the implementation process, since they enjoya high 
degree of discretion. Ir is important to remember that in Spain the main 
AVA W policies ha ve been legal reforms, precisely the measures in whose 
implementation the highest number of executives involved. An example 
might be useful to iIlustrate this point. In Spain, repeated domestic 
violence against women committed by their husbands or cohabiting 
partners is defined by the penal code since 1989 as an offence, and i$ 
punishable accordingly. For this law to be in fact applied, the police ancl 
civil guards have to know it, and be wiIling to receive and 
handle the complaints. Moreover, personnel who work in health 
and/or forensic surgeons ha ve to be prepared to examine the 
rapidly. If both health centre personnel and/or forensic surgeons nprtn,rm 
their tasks with delay, injuries might be partiaIly or totaIly healed, 
the victims of violence might be deprived of sorne of the most important 
incriminating evidence. In addition, it could be the case that victims oi 
domestic violence have to leave the family domicile, where violent acts 
are repeatedly committed against them, and can therefore be repeated 
in the near future. If victims do not have enough economic resources to 
afford other accommodation, and have no relatives who can l 
them, they might have to go to a refuge, if vacancies existo In sorne 
refuges are fulI, and their personnel (or social workers who work 
state agencies) have to decide rapidly which potential clients are to 
given preference, and which others have to be dismissed (or sent ro 
social services which provide accommodation to their clients). As for 
legal system, judges and prosecutors first investigate the cases, and 
convoke a trial where the aIleged perpetrator of violence is judged. J 
and prosecutors have to know the special characteristics of the offence 
repeated domestic violence, among other things, that it normaIly 
place in the domicile, without witnesses except the victims (or their 
children), and that proofs (injuries in most cases) might have already 
disappeared. Due to these and other characteristics of domestic assaults, 
judges and prosecutors have to be guided by the purpose of trying harder· 
than in other (easier) cases to elucidate cases of domestic violence in· 
order to punish the offenders. The coordination of the pertormamce. 
of alI these and any Qthers in volved is required in order ro effecti 
apply the 1989 legal reform in its explicit goal of protecting victims oi 
domestic violence. Such coordination is difficult to attain for multiple 
reasons, sorne of which are iIlustrated in the foIlowing section, which 
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examines the role played by different social and political agents in the 
policy-making process related to AVAW measures in Spain since 1975. 
SOCIAL AND POLlTlCAL AGENTS IN THE POLICY AREA OF 
MEASURES AGAINST VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN SPAIN 
SINCE I975 
GeneralIy speaking, in Spain the issue of violence against women had 
not been a priority for activists in the women's movement up to 
the late 1970s or early 1980s, when certain feminists 'discovered' 
the problem of violence against women in sorne cases accidentaIly 
(ThrelfaIl 1985, pp. 62-3). For instance, feminists from the Separated 
and Divorced Women's Association (Asociación de Mujeres Separadas 
y Divorciadas) who provided counseIling and legal advice to women 
who wanted ro initiate separation and/or divorce proceedings, found 
that the main purpose of many of their clients was to escape from a 
situation of high levels of domestic violence. By the same token, sorne 
activists who worked in health centres as physicians or psychologists 
were shocked by the high number of female victims of violence who 
turn to these centres for help. Such professionals started to suspect that 
the number of victims (from alI social and economic backgrounds) who 
did not ask for help, due to their lack of awareness of their rights, or 
simply their fear of being more violently treated by their aggressors if 
they dared to report their cases, was very high. 
The next step taken by feminists was to 'open the eyes' of state 
. officials and of the population in general, in order to develop zero 
tolerance towards violence against women. Women's advocates al so 
posed demands to policy-makers to intervene in this area, organizing 
·services for the relief and help of the victims, and reforming the legal 
system in order to effectively protect women against aggressors.1t should 
be borne in mind that in those years only very few statistics existed 
which counted the number of violent assaults on women (none which 
were reliable existed in the case of domestic violence). Therefore, it was 
extremely hard for feminists to argue convincingly before policy-makers 
that violence against women was a serious social problem (in many cases, 
a life-or-death matter for victims) which deserved state attention and 
solutions. 
One of the first means used by feminists to caIl attention to the 
magnitude of the phenomenon of violence against women and to 
demand the first state measures was the organization of sporadic 
but highly visible mass mobilizations against sexual attacks against 
women, mobilizations which also dated from the late 1970s and early 
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1980s. Demonstrations generally happened after violent assaults against 
female citizens (generally rapes) had taken place in a city or town. 
These first mass mobilizations were organized not only by feminists or 
members of other social movements (such as neighbours' associations-
asociaciónes de vecinos), but also by political parties and trades unions. 
Not only the organizers participated in these demonstrations, but also 
many other people who were not normally very active politically, but 
who felt concerned about the violence perpetrated on women who lived 
in their towns or cities. 
In 1982, a group of women who provided direct assistance to victims 
of violence constituted the Commission to Investigate the Ill-Treatment 
of Women (Comisión para la Investigación de los Malos Tratos a las 
Mujeres) . . This commission was composed mainly of social workers, 
psychologlStS and lawyers and they started to pressurize policy-makers 
with regard to the formulation of more AVAW measures, and to the 
implementation of those which already existed. For instance, they 
requested the Ministry of the Interior (Ministerio del Interior), on 
which the police and the civil guard depended, to remind police 
agents of their obligation to receive complaints of all cases of 
violent acts against women and to report them to the judicial 
institutions. Members of this commission also urged this Ministry 
to order agents to prepare statistics (Gutiérrez 1990, p. 124; Threlfall 
1985, p. 62). 
Activists in the women's movement rapidly found an important ally 
in state feminists. Since its establishment, one of the IW's priorities 
has been the issue of violence against women (Gutiérrez, 1990, p. 
124).11 Approximately 10-15 per cent of the IW's budget has been 
devoted to subsidize women's organizations. The emblematic services 
provided by feminists to female victims of violence - refuges - have 
been financed with the subsidies of the IW (and of other state units). 
The times of feminist activism based exclusively on goodwill, altruism 
and absolute lack of financial resources were over; high-cost services 
such as refuges could be instituted partly beca use of the existence of 
subsidies. 12 In addition, the IW, like the majority of state feminist 
institutions in the Western world, has neither the competence nor the 
budget to formulate and implement most gender equality policies, but 
does have the explicit task of trying to convince other state units to set 
themselves such policies. 
Feminist organizations which 'specialized' in the issue of violence 
against women were created mainly since the mid-1980s, including the 
Association of Assistance to Raped Women (Asociación de Asistencia 
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a Mujeres Violadas) or the Anti-Aggression Commission (Comisión 
Anti-Agresiones), but also others. In the mid-1980s then, two actors 
(state feminists and feminists) were already in motion defining the 
different dimensions of the problem of violence against women and 
pressurizing policy-makers to do something (or many things) to deal 
with such issues. They were not the only ones in the years to come. 
For instance, on November 5, 1986 a unit (ponencia del Senado de 
investigación de malos tratos a mujeres) of the Senate liaison with the 
Ombudsman and human rights committee (Comisión de relaciones con 
el Defensor del Pueblo y de los derechos humanos del Senado) was 
formed with the aim of collecting information about domestic violence 
against women in Spain, analyzing it and giving advice to the Ministries 
of Interior, Justice and Education about potential measures to be taken 
(Gutiérre, 1990, p. 124). The unit was headed by a female senator from 
the social-democratic party (Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol, PSOE), 
and its other members were two male PSOE senators, one male senator 
from the conservative party (Partido Popular), and one male senator 
from the mixed group (Grupo Mixto). The unit finished its works 
in Spring 1989. Its analyses and recommendations were very similar 
to those elaborated by many feminist groups and femocrats (Spanish 
Senate 1989). 
The concerted efforts of feminists and femocrats have been in the 
origins of the formulation of many AVAW policies described in the first 
section of the chapter. Nevertheless, state feminists and members of the 
women's movement found with dismay that, if it was hard to formulate 
A V A W measures (for instance, legal reforms), the implementation of them 
was not at all automatic. In fact, feminists and femocrats discovered 
that pressure had to be exercised constantly on state officials for 
programmes to become more than rhetorical declarations. In 1995 
the IW can show a positive record in having implicated other state 
units in the formulation of equality policies (AV A W measures, among 
them), which would probably not have been set up in the absence of the 
IW. In contrast, the IW has hardly intervened in the implementation of 
such policies, mainly due to the lack of personnel and material resources. 
As a consequence, feminists have been those who have insistently put 
pressure on street-level bureaucrats for programmes to be adequately 
implemented (or just put in practice). In the following paragraphs I 
describe the three main professional groups on which feminists have 
concentrated their lobbying efforts: the police and civil guard; personnel 
of health centers; and members of the judicial system. Needless to say, 
the prominence of these groups with regard to the implementation of 
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AVA W policies is not specific to the Spanish case. On the contrary, this 
is a common phenomenon in many other Western countries. 
With regard to the police and civil guard, an increasing number 
of agents have performed their duties impeccably while dealing with 
female victims of violence, but others have noto In fact, feminists have 
continuously complained about the insufficient protection given by the 
police and civil guard on sorne occasions to female victims especially 
in the case of domestic violence. Sometimes they have come too late 
when called precisely beca use violent acts being perpetrated were against 
women (Cova and Arozena 1985, p. 36). Moreover, they have not 
given proper protection to women who have been repeatedly victims 
of violent attacks. Sorne of these women have finally died or become 
severely injured. 
Peminists have also denounced the fact that, especially in the case of 
domestic violence, when women have gone to report violent attacks 
against them, the police and civil guards have sometimes tried hard to 
convince victims not to sign a complaint 'in their own benefit', and have 
acted as mediators in an effort to reconcile the two partners. In other 
cases these agents have not informed female victims that they had the 
right to be attended by police-women or female civil guards if they have 
been victims of violent assaults. Pinally, when female victims of violence 
are prostitutes, police and civil guards have not always performed their 
duties as diligently as in the case of other women. 
Activists in the women's movement have thought that one of the 
reasons to explain the lack of professionalism and low interest with 
which sorne police agents and civil guards can treat cases of violent 
assaults of women (especially if they are committed in the domes tic 
sphere), lies in the fact that a significant number of them still think 
that they should not be involved in such cases, because they belong to 
the sphere of the privacy of the individual, where the state should not 
intervene, or should intervene but has no adequate means to do it. Other 
agents simply do not believe the account given by sorne women while 
reporting episodes of domestic violence, and still others think that sorne 
women 'have asked for it'. Without denying the centrality of these sort 
of convictions, it is necessary to emphasize that police and civil guards 
can easily translate attitudes of indifference towards the phenomenon 
of violence against women into inaction or omission, since they are 
street-level bureaucrats with a high degree of discretion. In fact, Lipsky 
(1980, p. 13) identifies the police as one of the emblematic examples of 
such bureaucrats, who daily 'decide who to arrest and whose behaviour 
to overlook'. . 
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To overcome attitudes of indifference and weak performance of sorne 
police and civil guards, feminists have pressurized those authorities on 
which the police and civil guard depend to supervise their subordinates 
in order to make agents more active in matters of violent attacks 
against women. Por instance, in part as a result of such pressures, 
several circulars have been sent to police stations explaining the laws 
regarding the punishment of violent acts against women, ordering the 
police to be diligent in the performance of their duties in this matter 
and to collect statistics of reported cases (Ministerio del Interior and 
Instituto de la Mujer 1991, p. 110). In addition, since 1988 a police 
station dedicated exclusively to cases of violence against women, 
staffed only by policewomen, exists in Barcelona. In other cities, 
units specialized in such cases, where sorne policewomen work, but 
which are not police stations but departments within them, have also 
been set up. Furthermore, since the mid-1980s, courses and seminars 
about violence against women have been delivered to the police and 
civil guard (Gutiérrez 1990, p. 129; Instituto de la Mujer 1986, 
pp. 15-16). Nowadays then, after more than a decade of feminists' 
mobilizations, sorne female victims of violence have been attended in 
stations by policewomen (or by policemen knowledgeable about the 
issue), sorne victims have been truly protected from their aggressors, 
and sorne statistics have been collected. Nevertheless, these cases are 
still not the absolute majority. Therefore, there is still a lot to be done 
with regard to the police and civil guard in this policy area. 
In relation to personnel in health services, feminists have insistently 
denounced these street-Ievel bureaucrats for not always examining the 
victims of violence as soon as they had too Moreover, such examinations 
have not always been as exhaustive as they are supposed to be (Gutiérrez 
1989, pp. 26-7). In addition, the privacy and intimacy of the victim has 
not always been sufficiently protected while being examined. Feminists 
and femocrats have then pressurized the appropriate authorities to order 
such professionals to be more diligent in their assistance to the victims. As 
a result, sorne professionals are currently more responsive to the needs 
of female victims of violence, but again, they are not the majority. As it 
has been noted (Heise et al. 1994, p. 1172), people who work in the 
health system are crucial, because 'as one of the few institutions that 
see women throughout their lives, the health sector is particularly well 
placed to identify and refer victims to available services'. 
The third are a of feminists' concern related to the implementation of 
AVAW policies has been the functioning of the judiciary. In fact, sorne 
have identified it as the biggest obstacle for the successful implementation 
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of measures against perpetrators of violent attacks against women 
(Gutiérrez 1989, pp. 42-3; Threlfall 1985, p. 61). Women's advocates 
have insistently complained about the slowness and superficiality which 
has ch.ar~~terized :he examination of victims by sorne forensic surgeons 
(As~;:laClon Espanola de MUJeres Separadas y Divorciadas 1985, p. 23; 
Gutlerrez 1989, pp. 25-6). In addition, feminists have objected about 
the re~evan~ number of complaints of violent attacks against women 
~espeCIally 10 the case of domestic violence) which are classified by 
Judges of the lower courts as misdemeanours instead of offences, and 
have t~e~efore been punished accordingly in the subsequent tria!. 
. F~mlllIsts have also denounced several practices that regularly occur 
10 tnals.' practic~s ~hich hinder the explicit aim of the laws of effectively 
protectlOg the VlCtlms and punishing the perpetrators of violence. First 
of all, as it has been explained by Allison and Wrightsman (1993 pp. 
171-94) f.or r~pe trials in the USA context, and by Sue Lees (1992') for 
murder tnals 10 Great Britain, on many occasions a trial of violent acts 
against wom~n becomes a trial of the victims. They frequently have to 
ans.~e~ questlons related to their style of living or to their past sexual 
actlvltles, under the suspicion that sorne women (for instance those 
who go out alone at night, or who frequent bars, or who do n~t have 
a permanent domicile or a stable partner, or wear certain types of 
cloth~s, or are con~eptualize~ as promiscuous) put themselves in danger 
of belO~ treated vlOlently, slOce they might indirectly induce men to 
behave 10 such a way. Feminists have demanded with vehemence that 
judge.s, prosecutors and lawyers do not investigate the priva te life of 
the .vlctlms .unless .it is st~ictly necessary, since what is to be judged in 
a tnal of thl~ type IS t~e vlOlent behaviour of the presumed perpetrator, 
and not the l.n~lmate IIfe of the victim (Instituto de la Mujer 1985, pp. 
71-2}. A declslOn of the Supreme Court of Justice (Tribunal Supremo), 
that I.S, t~e highest judicial unit in all matters except those related to 
constl~utlOnal guarantees, in 1990, corroborated feminists' arguments, 
?e.clanng th~t the se.xuallife of a victim of rape before rape takes place 
IS melevant 10 th~ tnal (El País, November 51990, p. 29). Nevertheless, 
even now som~ Judges, prosecutors and lawyers make investigations 
about the prevlOus sexual IIfe of the victim, investigations which are 
not at all necessary for the elucidation of the cases. 
The feminist movement has also complained that in cases of 
insu!ficien.t p~oof, prosecutors very often are not active enough in 
the IOvestlgatlOn of violent acts against women before the trial takes 
place, and do not subsequently maintain charges against presumed 
perpetrators of violence (Baiges 1985, p. 11; Cova and Arozena 1985 
, 
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p. 36). This alleged deficit in maintaining charges by prosecum,.t. 
very important, beca use when judges write court decisions theyftl3t.h 
perpetrators of violence with a punishment equal or lower thanG' 
punishment demanded by prosecutors.' 
Another battlefront of feminists' struggles has been the investiSltlon 
during the trial of the reactions of female victims of violence, espec1aUy 
in cases of rape. The penal code does not say anything about this mltfer, 
but in Spain, as in many other countries, it has been a widespflad 
requirement in trials that rape victims prove that they had very activel)' 
resisted their aggressors. This de (acto requirement is paradoxical, sinot 
victims of other offences or misdemeanours, for instance, robbery, dld 
not have to prove that they had resisted the thieves. After numerOt.ll. 
decisions by the Supreme Court of Justice which made reference to tÚ";; 
high degree of resistance of rape victims, the Supreme Court of Justiaf~·. 
affirmed in a decision of 1987 that rape victims do not have to prove thlt 
they have 'heroically' resisted rapists, and that itwas enough to show that 
they have been intimidated or threatened, for instance, with a knife (El 
País, October 8 1987, p. 29). While the matter seemed theoretically ro 
have been set, feminists have complained that in many trials victims are 
still asked to prove that their degree of resistance to rapists was high. As 
a consequence of this and the investigation of the degree of the resistance, 
victims have had to answer humiliating and embarrassing questions. For 
instance, in 1989, in a rape trial, the presumed victim was asked if the 
day of the rape she wore underpants. According to the president of the 
court, the question was necessary in order to calibrate how the alleged 
rapist had acted (and the victim resisted), taking in mind that he had a 
knife in one hand, and with the other he had to take sorne clothes off 
the victim, a task which would have been harder or easier depending 
on her resistance (El País, June 27 1989, p. 24; June 28 1989, p. 31). 
Finally, the unfairness of several punishments given to perpetrators 
of violent attacks on women committed in the domestic sphere has been 
denounced, especially economic sanctions and house arrest (arresto 
domiciliario) (Baiges 1985, p. 10). With respect to economic sanctions, 
it should be borne in mind that the most common marital property 
regime in Spain is community property (gananciales). Under this regime 
each spouse is the owner of half of common properties, that is, of all 
properties and income obtained by any of the two spouses since they 
marry. When in this situation a violent husband has a fine imposed 
on him, he normally pays it with common properties, half of which 
belong to his wife. Therefore, this fine damages the financial position 
of his spouse, who might have been herself the victim of violence. 
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With regard to house arrest, It IS In many cases a counterproductive 
punishment for the obvious reason that in the common situation in 
which the perpetrator and the victim are husband and wife and live 
together, it is the latter who final!y might suffer the consequences of 
the punishment, since the perpetrator might behave more violently while 
under house arresto 
Feminists have found several allies in their demands on the judiciary. 
For example, a minority sector of judges and prosecutors is sensitive 
to women's demands and has supported them while pressing charges 
and writing court decisions under criteria that sometimes have gone 
far in the interpretation of the laws. For instance, in one case the judge 
considered that a woman had been raped in a case of anal coi tus, at 
a time when, according to the law, rape could only take place in 
cases of vaginal coitus (El País, ]anuary 19 1989, p. 32). Feminists 
and their allies have pressurized policy-makers in high positions to set 
up guidelines to make the judicial system an efficient mechanism to 
punish violent attacks. Several superior organs of the judiciary, like the 
attorney-general of the state (Fiscal General del Estado), that is, the 
supreme organ of the prosecutors, or the Ministry of ]ustice, have sent 
circulars asking prosecutors to be more active in the defence of female 
victims of violent acts and in the investigation of cases, and to col!ect 
data (Gutiérrez 1989, pp. 10-13). As a result of these and other efforts, 
sorne trials now take place without irregularities, but not al! of them. 
It should be stressed that judges and prosecutors are also street-Ievel 
bureaucrats with a high degree of autonomy. The former have also been 
identified by Lipsky (1980, p. 13) as another emblematic example of 
bureaucrats, who 'decide who shall receive a suspended sentence and 
who shall receive maximum punishment'. In fact, the attorney-general 
of the state can dictate mandatory norms about how prosecutors have 
to perform their duties. By contrast, judges are independent, meaning 
by this independence that no state unit exists with capacity to give 
mandatory instructions to them, and that they write court decisions 
only in accordance with the constitution and Spanish laws, but DOt to 
any other type of instruction (Gutiérrez 1989, pp. 9-11). 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has described the main policies against violence against 
women established in Spaínafter 1975. It has al so been argued that 
if many difficulties arise when A V A W policies are formulated, the 
stage which is full of (sometimes insurmountable) obstacles is the 
implementation phase. This is due not to the patriarchal necessity of 
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violence as a means to maintain rhe domination of women by men, nor 
to the definition that in sorne countries policy-makers (and feminists) 
make about the betterment of women's condirions (mainly in terms 
of access to waged labour outside the home, a definition which turns 
attention away from the phenomenon of violence against women, as 
several scholars have argued). The difficulties in the implementation 
stage of A V A W policies arise chiefly beca use of the high number of 
street-Ievel bureaucrats involved in the implementation of most AVA W 
policies, including: judges, prosecutors, lawyers, police, civil guards, 
forensic surgeons and personnel in health centres, among others. 
Characteristic of these street-level bureaucrats is direct dealing with 
'clients', and the high degree of discretion and autonomy that they 
ha ve while performing their jobs. Therefore, each of these bureaucrats 
is in a key position to jeopardize the implementation of any AVA W 
programme. For a policy to be implemented, the concerted action of 
al! these bureaucrats is necessary. Such concerted action is difficult 
to organize, beca use, among other reasons, each has priorities and 
ways of working, which might probably be different from those of 
other bureaucrats. In addition, obvious as it might be, since violent 
acts against women are perpetrated everywhere, the implementation 
of A V A W policies is a very decentralized process. As a consequence, 
for a successful implementation in any single vil!age, toWn or city, al! 
these street-Ievel bureaucrats have to be willing and prepared to assist 
yictíms of violence. Furthermore, when so many agents are involved, 
the question of 'who does what' remains in sorne cases permanently 
ettled. The interviews conducted for the preparation of this chapter 
show the existen ce of sorne disagreements among several agents in this 
regard, for instance, in sorne cases, between personnel who work in 
health centres and forensíc surgeons. 
Two or three decades ago feminists realízed in al! countries that 
women live in a violent world. An increasing number of activists have 
subsequently thought that effective resistance to the phenomenon of 
yiolence against women across countries should involve not only the 
women's movement but also the state (Heise et al. 1994, p. 1174). 
Nevertheless, the findings of this paper remind us that it is important 
ior feminists to concentrate their pressure on the state not only with 
regard to the formulation of new A V A W mea sures but also to the 
implementation of those which already existo Besides, due to. t.he 
high degree of decentralization of the implementation of AVAW pO.}¡~les 
the high degree of autonomy of street-Ievel bureaucrats, femInlsts 
.. have to put pressure not only on the superiors of these bureaucrats, 
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but also on each single bureaucrat of this type. As a consequence, 
activists in the women's movement accurately sense that they have 
to fight on numerous fronts, and that batdes are fought but nev~r 
completely won. 
If the description of the characteristics and dynamics of this policy 
area made in this chapter is accurate, it might be concluded that feminists' 
provision of direct help to the victims of violence is still going to be useful 
and irreplaceable in the following years. Feminists' direct assistance to 
victims is sometimes an easier task than the lobbying activities to state 
units, since such assistance can in sorne cases be organized by feminists 
alone, or by feminists and femocrats without resorting to a high number 
of street-Ievel bureaucrats. This has been in fact the strategy pursued 
by women's advocates in Spain in the last twO decades. It is not only 
that the supply of direct assistance to victims (and programmes for the 
population in general) has never been abandoned, but al so that such 
programmes have flourished in the last years. 
In the past two decades the main AVAW policies have been leg 
reforms, characterized by the many difficulties in their implementati 
due to the fact that it is precisely in this type of measure where the hi 
number of street-Ievel bureaucrats are involved, sorne of whom 
instance, judges) perform their task with the highest degree of auto 
Nevertheless, generally speaking, obstacles for the implementation 
A V A W programmes might be tempered in the near future since 
highly possible that the importance of other A VA W policies 
from legal reforms (for instance, social services) will increase. 
also encouraging to bear in mind that the issue of violence 
women, together with abortion, are still unifying motives for 
different branches of the Spanish feminist movement to engage 
joint activities, even though the movement, in relation to other 
has usually been very fragmented. 
Notes 
I would like ro thank Angel J. Sánchez for his help provided in the 
secondary sources and Roberto Garvía for his priceless comments on an earlier 
of this chapter. 
2 Since the 1960s, institutions with the concrete purpose of promoting gender equality 
been set up, developed (and sometimes even dismantled) in most industrial 
In social science literature such institutions have been called 'state feminist' 
or bureaucracies. The people who work in them are described as 'femocrats' 
feminists'. 
3 This chapter is largely based on an analysis of secondary literature, legislation, 
and unpublished political documents and se venteen in-depth personal interviews 
members of women's organizations, one judge, one police agent, three civil 
agents mainly for the rural areas), one social worker, twO members of the n",·«",n .. r~ 
work in a battered women's refuge, one female victim of violence, one forensic 
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one physician specialist in the examination of female victims of violence, and two la",'Vers 
speclahst m AVAW legal measures, conducted m Madrid in March 1995. In order to main~ain 
the anonymltv of the mtervlewed, their names do not appear in this chapter. 
4 I wIII concentra te on the central-state pohCles considered most televant that is those 
whlch aHect a large number of women, and/or are financed with a sig~ificant ~mount 
of pubhc resources, and/or are speCJally mnovative. The description of the programmes 
made here IS by no means exhaustive. 
5 This. type of rerminology alsü enjoyed certain currency in other Roman law countries. 
For mstance, m ltaly, sexual vlOlence was listed in the penal code under the title 'crimes 
agalnst publlc moralltv and nght living' (Addis 1989 p 2) In F I I 
. . d . . . ' .. rance, sexua assau ts 
"ere p,rosecute accordlng ro an artlele of the penal code which dealt with 'assaults o 
morals (Stetson 1987, p. 163). n 
6 Divorce had also existed during the II Republic (1931-6), but it was abolished bv the 
subsequent dlctarorshlp. . 
7 According ro artiele 81 of the 1978 Constitution, an organic Act (Ley orga1lica) regula tes 
among other marters, fundamental nghts and public liberties. An absolute majoritv oí 
the Low. Chamber, In a final vote of the whole project is necessary for the appr~val, 
modlficatlOn or deroga non of an orgamc Acr. For an ordinarv - n t . - A 
only a simple majoriry is required. . o orgamc ct, 
8 These information centres were not an original creation of the IW b h f S bd' G I i ' ecause t e ormer 
lt /reCCI01l enera e a Mujer dependent on the Ministry of Culture h d I d 
set up th h' h h IW' h ' a a rea v ree centres, W IC t e m erited. The number of centres iricreased steadil~ 
Whereas In 1984 there were only three, from 1987 on there are eleven. . . 
9 The number 01 reported rapes has been in Spain: 1 723 in 1989· 1789' 1990· 1936 . 
1991; and 1,599 in 1992. The number of reported' sexual aggr;ssi~ns h~~ been; 2'502 :~ 
1989; 2,277 In 1990; 2,282 In 1991; and 2,335 in 1992. Finally, the number of r~ported 
ca_s~s, of domestlc vlOlence agalnst women has been: 13,705 in 1984; 15,681 in 1986; 
1),dO In 1987; 13,644 In 1988; 17,738 In 1989; 15,654 in 1990; 15,462 in 1991; and 
15,184 In 1992 (Illstltuto de la MUJer, 1994, pp. 92-3). 
The first bartered women's refuge \Vas set up in 1971 in Great Britain (Connors 1989 
p. 34) and In 1974 In the USA (Srout 1992, p. 134). ' , 
The esta bhshment and characteristics of the IW, its effects on policy-making and the 
relatlOnShlps between state femlmsts and activists in the women's movement are described 
In Vahente (1995). 
The IW's policy of subsidizing the women's movement is described in Valiente (1995). 
